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Introduction  
Much has been written about the A.Q. Khan network since the Libyan “coming out” of December 
2003. However, most analysts have focused on the exports made by Pakistan without attempting 
to relate them to Pakistani imports. To understand the very nature of the network, it is necessary 
to go back to its “roots,” that is, the beginnings of the Pakistani nuclear program in the early 
1970s, and then to the transformation of the network during the early 1980s. Only then does it 
appear clearly that the comparison to a “Wal-Mart” (the famous expression used by IAEA Director 
General Mohammed El-Baradei) is not an appropriate description. The Khan network was in fact 
a privatized subsidiary of a larger, State-based network originally dedicated to the Pakistani 
nuclear program. It would be much better characterized as an “imports-exports enterprise.”  
I. Creating the Network: Pakistani Nuclear Imports  
Pakistan originally developed its nuclear complex out in the open, through major State-approved 
contracts. Reprocessing technology was sought even before the launching of the military program: 
in 1971, an experimental facility was sold by British Nuclear Fuels Ltd (BNFL) in 1971. In 1974, 
Pakistan signed a contract with the French company Saint-Gobain Techniques Nouvelles (SGN) 
for the sale of a large reprocessing plant at Chashma, which was to use the fuel irradiated at 
KANUPP.[1] Nonproliferation concerns led the French to suggest a change in the design that 
would make Pakistan unable to produce weapon-grade plutonium. Islamabad’s refusal led Paris 
to stop the execution of the contract in 1978. This did not prevent European firms to participate in 
the Pakistani nuclear program. In fact, SGN engineered the pilot reprocessing plant at 
PINSTECH (“New Labs”), while Belgonucléaire designed the overall building and built a fuel 
refabrication laboratory.[2] However, the 1974 Indian test led Western countries to be much more 
cautious about their nuclear exports to Pakistan.  
This is one of the reasons why Islamabad launched a second, secret nuclear program in the mid-
1970s which was to use the HEU route. The launching of this program saw the beginning of a 
massive campaign of imports from Western firms. Equipment sought by Pakistan included key 
elements for centrifuges (maraging steel, high-frequency inverters, high-vacuum valves, scoops 
pre-forms, bottom bearing pre-forms…). But the imports network also sought many elements for 
the plutonium program (hot cell manipulators, reprocessing equipment), as well as components 
meant for the nuclear weapons themselves (high-speed electronic switches). Measuring 
equipment was also actively sought. Pakistani imports also included nuclear materials and metals. 
Imports ranged from full-scale installations to subcomponents.  
Some of the most significant of these imports included uranium conversion facilities (CES Kalthof 
GmbH, Germany, late 1970s); several thousands tubes of maraging steel (Van Doorne 
Transmissie, Netherlands, late 1970s); a yellowcake production unit (Société d’études et de 
travaux pour l’uranium, France, late 1970s) ; a reprocessing facility (Saint-Gobain Techniques 
Nouvelles, France, and Belgonucléaire, Belgium, late 1970s); a heavy water production facility 
(Belgonucléaire, late 1970s); and a tritium production facility (Nukleartechnik GmbH, Germany, 
late 1980s).  
At the same time, Pakistan resorted to China as an alternate source of imports. Chinese 
assistance developed after ZA Bhutto signed a bilateral agreement to that effect at the occasion 
of a visit to Beijing in late May 1976. China helped Pakistan overcoming some of the difficulties 
they had in mastering enrichment technology. It supplied uranium hexafluoride to Pakistan, as 
well as a HEU-based nuclear weapons design.  
The imports network was originally a “Khan network,” but not in reference to A.Q. Khan. A 
different individual was running the show: most imports from the West were supervised by Munir 
Ahmad Khan, the head of the Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission and arguably the true “father” 
of Pakistan’s bomb. One of the network’s key operatives, and probably its chief operating officer 
for Europe was SA Butt, a physicist turned diplomat, who was assigned to various embassies. 
The network began operating in earnest in 1976. Having just returned from the Netherlands, A.Q. 
Khan soon played a crucial role, but only in the management of imports related to the 
centrifugation technology. SA Butt managed both the uranium-related and plutonium-related 
imports.[3] He remained in charge at least until the late 1980s.  
The imports network’s modus operandi included a combination of several elements that ensured 
its success and longevity. Pakistan resorted systematically to the use of its embassies abroad, 
and often to Pakistani-born foreign nationals. It paid more than the market value of the items 
purchased. The Pakistanis played smart and were always one step ahead of the legality. As 
exports controls began to be reinforced in the late 1970s, they purchased individual components 
rather than entire units. After, they often learned how to reproduce the parts. Pakistan also sought 
to import “pre-forms,” which are not necessarily covered by exports controls. Besides classic 
tricks such as multiple buyers, multiple intermediaries, front companies and false end-user 
certificates, Pakistan used more imaginative tactics: for instance, it sometimes hid a critical 
component in a long list of useless material. It also often limited its “shopping lists” to a few 
samples, in order to learn how to reproduce them. A British intelligence report stated in 2003 that 
no less than 95 Pakistani organizations and government bodies, including diplomatic posts 
abroad, had assisted in the country’s nuclear imports.[4]  
The Pakistani modus operandi was very similar from the one used by Iraq in the 1980s. Baghdad 
then resorted to an increasingly refined imports strategy which heavily relied on multiple fake 
companies, and sought at least two sources for any given material it needed. Iraqi embassies 
were heavily involved. Note also that several individuals and companies (German and Swiss in 
particular) were selling to both countries. One difference, however, is that the Pakistani network 
was more centralized than the Iraqi one.  
The success of the imports network was not only due to the high degree of Pakistani know-how, 
but also to the active cooperation of Western firms. Pakistan took advantage of inadequate 
exports control in light of the appetite of Western firms to sell technology abroad. The first IAEA 
guidelines published in 1974 were very limited. It was a grey market rather than a black one. 
Many industrialists reasoned that “if we do not do it, others will” and deliberately violated the law. 
Others believe that Pakistan would not be able to use the components for military usage. Many 
just did not realize that they were helping Islamabad to get the Bomb—or did not want to know.[5] 
Finally, some of the main figures involved in Pakistani imports have stated that they were very 
deliberately helping the spread of nuclear technology, arguing that it would make the world more 
secure.[6]  
European firms were particularly targeted. Pakistan also took advantage of the existence of 
liberal trade policies among European Community members, which allowed Pakistan to hide the 
final destination of a given equipment. But the most important reason was that despite the wake-
up call of the Indian test, many European countries in the 1970s were not entirely committed to 
the best nonproliferation efforts. Proliferation was not yet much of a concern, and exports controls 
were particularly weak. There was also a political element. There was resistance to U.S. 
pressures, either because of some countries’ independent political stance vis-à-vis the United 
States, such as France or Switzerland, or because of their desire to promote national products: 
as an observer puts it, “West Germany and the Netherlands made a national priority of promoting 
manufactured exports, particularly when they involved precision engineering, and they viewed 
some of the American lobbying about exports to Pakistan as just another form of trade 
competition.”[7] Also, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, the three URENCO 
countries, were overtly promoting an open enrichment market. Along with other European 
countries, they worried about a U.S. domination of the nuclear market: the formation of URENCO 
was “an act of resistance.”[8] Finally, the bureaucracies would not always implement political 
guidance. Attitudes would change only slowly.  
In sum, three words can help understanding the attitudes of European firms and individuals 
involved in Pakistani nuclear imports: denial, delusion, and defiance.  
Finally, there was the extent of A.Q. Khan’s personal contacts on the continent. A.Q. Khan’s 
personal contribution was to bring back a long list of companies and of individuals he personally 
knew, who could be helpful for Pakistani imports. After returning to Pakistan in December 1975, 
he wrote to several former colleagues to get specific technical information.[9] He relied on long-
time acquaintances such as Henk Slebos, a Dutch metallurgist he met in 1964; Peter Griffin, a 
British engineer he met in 1976; Friedrich Tinner, a Swiss engineer and long-time associate; 
Gotthard Lerch, a German engineer met in the 1970s; and Abdus Salam, a British national and 
another personal friend.  
The high number of German companies involved in Pakistani nuclear imports can be explained 
by several factors. The know-how of this country in machine-tools, engineering and precision 
mechanics is well-known. Germany was also involved in the nuclear enrichment business through 
URENCO. Not being a nuclear power, its exports controls in this field were even less efficient 
than those of France and the United Kingdom for reasons of expertise. For the same reason, 
scientists and engineers with nuclear expertise from these two countries were likely to be 
involved in national nuclear programs. German nuclear exports controls were for a long time 
notoriously weaker than those of major other European States; this reflected a deliberate policy of 
self-assertiveness in the face of U.S. pressures.[10] Finally, A.Q. Khan had extensive contacts in 
Germany dating from his stay in Europe. As a result, in 1990, a member of the German 
Parliament could say that the country’s export controllers motto was still “you never hear anything, 
you never see anything—and, in particular, you never block anything.”[11] In 1989, the Stern 
magazine reported that throughout the 1980s, no less than 70 German firms had sold nuclear-
related goods to enterprises known to be associated with the Pakistani program.[12]  
Some of these explanations also apply to Switzerland. Early Swiss nuclear exports restrictions 
were strictly respected even if it meant that a proliferation risk might be taken. As a commentator 
puts it, “rules are rules, especially to the Swiss.”[13] As in the case of Germany, the legalist 
stance of Berne was “part of a strategy to promote the interests of the Swiss industry.”[14] More 
specifically, in the case of Switzerland, some have perceived for a long time “a divergence 
between the Swiss ideal of neutrality that include freedom of trade and the concept of 
nonproliferation.”[15] These attitudes may have persisted. As late as 2004, the Malaysian police 
report about the network was seen in some federal circles as “a possible attempt to damage the 
image of Switzerland abroad and the competitiveness of Swiss exports.”[16] 
But U.S. exports were far from being immune to criticism. As late as 1994, a U.S. General 
Accounting Office report stated that they were still woefully inadequate.[17] Between 1998 and 
1992, more than 80% applications for exports of nuclear-related equipment to Pakistan were 
approved (650 out of 808), including three to sensitive end-users (out of nine applications).[18] 
Pakistan actively sought materials and equipment from the United States. There is, in fact, a high 
number of documented “failures” by Pakistan to import nuclear-related material from the United 
States. This indicates either that the United States was particularly targeted, or that U.S. exports 
controls were more efficient—or a little bit of both, as is probable.  
II. Reversing the Flow? Pakistani Nuclear Exports  
Starting somewhere around the mid 1980s, Pakistan began to export its nuclear technology and 
know-how. However, the known cases of Pakistani exports are fairly different one from another. 
An in-depth examination of the four documented country cases (Iran, North Korea, Iraq, Libya) is 
necessary to understand the complexity of the Khan affair.  
The Iranian case  
Exports to Iran are a complex story. In fact, there seem to have been three different phases in the 
decade-long history of Pakistani transfers to Iran.  
First, there was a period of limited cooperation probably approved by general Zia-ul-Haq himself, 
which began in 1987. A secret bilateral agreement was reportedly signed in 1987, which included 
provisions for training of Iranian scientists.[19] A negotiation took place in Dubai of the selling of 
P1 centrifuge diagrams, an enrichment plant diagram, and spare parts for at least one P1 
machine.[20] Zia had, it seems, had authorized the initiation of a bilateral nuclear cooperation 
while asking for it to remain limited.[21] He did not want Iran to get the Bomb. Meanwhile, Khan 
was reportedly telling military authorities that the transfers were of very limited importance, since 
they concerned only used and or obsolete equipments.[22] He probably felt “covered” by Zia’s 
approval for technology transfers to Tehran. But he may also have been encouraged by general 
Mirza Aslam Beg, in his capacity of Army Vice-Chief of Army staff, who was ready to do more. 
MA Beg reports that emissaries from Iran first approached Pakistan near the end of the Iran–Iraq 
war, with broad requests of military sales, which were according to him denied by President Zia. 
This is consistent with what a former Pakistani ambassador to Iran reported, namely that Zia 
refused to abide by an Iranian request for mastery of the fuel cycle, made in Tehran in January 
1988.[23]  
After Zia’s death, the two parties may have envisioned a more complete cooperation, under 
pressure from general Beg, but probably with the knowledge of political authorities. A.Q. Khan 
was certainly encouraged to act in this direction by Beg and President Ghulam Ishaq Khan when 
they abruptly came to power after Zia’s death in August 1988. According to a Pakistani account, 
A.Q. Khan’s first move when Benazir Bhutto came to power (December 1988) was to ask her to 
make him PAEC director; when she refused, he chose to place his loyalty with MA Beg and GI 
Khan.[24] Beg has consistently denied having approved such transfers, but has confirmed the 
scope of nuclear discussions between Tehran and Islamabad at the time, at Iran’s initiative. But 
he and Benazir Bhutto were constantly telling them to go and see the other party.[25] A former 
U.S. administration official, Henry Rowen, says that Beg threatened in January 1990 to transfer 
military usage nuclear technology should Washington stopped arms sales to Pakistan.[26] There 
is evidence that Benazir Bhutto’s government knew about this cooperation. She was told in 1989 
by Hashemi Rafsandjani that the Pakistani military had offered nuclear technology to Iran.[27] 
A.Q. Khan has said that the transfers were encouraged by the military adviser to Mrs. Bhutto, 
general Imtiaz Ali, and explicitly authorized by Beg.[28]  
In a third phase, the two countries seem to have begun a closer cooperation, in line with a 
growing convergence of interests. Two events changed the Pakistani perspective. One was the 
invasion of Kuwait. The other was the imposition of U.S. sanctions under the Pressler 
amendment. An Iranian-Pakistani nuclear cooperation was coherent with general Beg’s strategic 
choices. Beg initially approved Pakistan’s participation in the coalition against Iraq; but by the end 
of 1990 he changed his mind.[29] He actively sought a partnership with Iran to protect against the 
United States.[30] Political reasons were not the only ones at play: general Beg thought it was a 
good way to finance the defense budget, especially in the light of coming U.S. sanctions. There 
were high-level contacts to that effect between the two governments during the year 1991. 
Envoys of Hashemi Rafsanjani visited Sharif in February and July 1991. It is difficult to know with 
certainty what became of these projects. Some claim that Pakistan and Iran did agree on nuclear 
cooperation and discussed the possibility of mutual defense treaty.[31] What is clear is that the 
bilateral cooperation that was envisioned by the two countries was a two-way street: it did not 
concern only nuclear technology, but also conventional arms, probably oil, as well as mutual 
political support. The nuclear transfers of that period involved diagrams for P1 and P2 centrifuges, 
500 used P1 centrifuges in a disassembled form—all delivered in the years 1994-1995; as well as 
a document describing “the casting of enriched and depleted uranium metal into hemispheres, 
related to the fabrication of nuclear weapons components.”[32] Some shipments reportedly took 
place after 1995, perhaps as late as 2000.[33] This second influx of Pakistani technology to Iran 
took place during Mrs. Bhutto’s second mandate. Given the extent of government-to-government 
contacts, it certainly took place with the knowledge of several key authorities.  
The North Korean case  
The Pakistan-North Korea strategic connection was established in 1971, when ZA Bhutto made 
Pyongyang a major source of conventional arms procurement. The Iraq-Iran war cemented the 
partnership between the two countries, who both aided Tehran’s missile program.[34] A defense 
cooperation package was agreed upon at the occasion of Benazir Bhutto’s December 1993 visit 
to Pyongyang. The precise role of A.Q. Khan remains unclear. He travelled several times to North 
Korea, and he may very well have been the initiator of the missile deal. He was given a tour of 
Pyongyang’s nuclear facilities in 1999.[35] It is possible that he felt that he was “covered” by the 
military authorities because of the Iran precedent. In any case, it seems likely that the military 
knew about the nuclear exports. General Jehangir Karamat (chief of Army staff from 1996 to 1998) 
seems to have played a significant role in the DPRK-Pakistan connection.[36]  
Known transfers lasted until around July 2002. According to Musharraf, “probably a dozen” 
centrifuges were sold.[37] Most available sources refer to P-1 technology, but some have 
suggested they may have included P-2 centrifuges.[38] There are also allegations of a broader 
cooperation in the nuclear area.[39]  
The most likely explanation of what happened with  North Korea is that it was a quid pro quo. This 
is what the U.S. government believed in the late 1990s.[40] However, the story may be more 
complex. Nuclear exports began much later than missile imports. Bhutto is on the record for 
stating that her 1993 deal involved paying for the missiles in cash. Well-informed analysts have 
stated that the latter were financed by “money and rice.”[41] The Pakistani “reserve crunch” might 
have prompted Pakistan to turn from cash to nuclear technology in return for missile 
technology.[42] The most detailed studies about the DPRK-Pakistan relationship have refrained 
from drawing definitive conclusions about its nature, especially given the uncertainties about the 
exact scope of the nuclear relationship.[43]  
 
The Iraqi case  
Available sources indicate that the initial contact with Iraq was made just a few weeks after the 
invasion of Kuwait. A note from the Iraqi intelligence services, dated October 6, reports that A.Q. 
Khan was ready to help Baghdad to “establish a project to enrich uranium and manufacture a 
nuclear weapon.” It reported that A.Q. Khan was prepared to give Iraq “project designs for a 
nuclear bomb.” Equipments were to be transferred from European companies to Iraq via a Dubai-
based company.[44] The Iraqi government, however, feared that it was a sting operation.[45]  
Such a gesture would have been consisted with general Beg’s opposition to Pakistani 
participation in the international coalition. At the same time, however, if Beg was keen to help Iran, 
it would have been illogical for him to support the development of an Iraqi bomb at the same time. 
Helping Saddam Hussein, Iran’s mortal enemy, to get nuclear weapons might have been 
consistent with Beg’s political preferences (a staunch opponent of U.S. influence in the region), 
but completely at odds with his personal culture (a Shi’a with strong admiration for Iran).  
The Libyan case 
While the nuclear relationship with Libya began in the mid-1970s, concrete transfers took place 
only after the reinvigoration of Libya’s program in 1995. Contact was made the Khan network at 
that time.[46] In 1997, Libya received 20 complete L1 centrifuges and most of the components for 
another 200. In 2000, it received two complete but “second-hand” L2 centrifuges, as well as one 
cylinder containing 1,7 ton of UF6. In late 2001 or early 2002, documentation on nuclear weapon 
design, including the “Chinese blueprint,” was transferred. In late 2002, components for a large 
number of L2 began to arrive.[47]  
The reasons behind the Libya transfers remain unclear. Personal greed, and perhaps a 
temptation to give the Bomb to a Muslim country that had helped so much Pakistan in the past 
were in all likelihood the determining factors. But one has to wonder how it was possible that 
transfers of nuclear technology to Libya could have taken place after 2001. It seems that A.Q. 
Khan was allowed to continue his travels even after he was ousted of KRL in March 2001.[48] 
The reason may be that he had the keys to the imports network, still vital for the Pakistani nuclear 
program. (He remained "Special Adviser to the Chief Executive on Strategic and KRL Affairs" 
after his dismissal.)  
III. Understanding the Nature of the Network  
Different cases, different responsibilities  
Pakistani nuclear exports were probably, to a significant extent, an individual initiative. Most 
knowledgeable observers of the Pakistani scene agree that A.Q. Khan had an important degree 
of autonomy. If nuclear exports had been a consistent State policy, then it would have been 
logical that PAEC had a role in it too, which does not seem to have been the case. This does not 
exonerate Pakistani authorities but, as an observer put it, “Khan likely exceeded whatever 
mandate he received from the Pakistani leadership.”[49] He may have felt that he was “covered” 
for whatever he did by the large amount of trust and autonomy he was enticed with. It seems in 
fact that A.Q. Khan was able to manipulate the government and the Pakistani authorities did not 
want to know what was going on. For instance, he would tell the Prime minister that he needed to 
Iran for reasons of national security, and that would be enough. “As long as Khan’s group 
delivered the goods, no state authority questioned his tactics.”[50] Khan’s personal profits were 
reportedly known by the ISI since 1988, but Pakistan’s military authorities refused to act.[51] Such 
moves were made easy by the secrecy and compartmentalization of Pakistan’s program until the 
late 1990s, which did not create the best conditions for oversight.  
Three events changed the picture: the 1998 tests, the 1999 coup, the 2001 attacks and their 
aftermath. There was a progressive reorganization of Pakistan’s nuclear program between 1998 
and 2001. The nuclear laboratories were reined in and A.Q. Khan was forced to retire. Several 
explanations exist as per the reasons of this decision. Some U.S. officials have said that this was 
an American request.[52] It may also have been Musharraf’s own initiative—or a combination of 
both. After the 1998 tests, Pakistan was under strong pressure from the United States to show 
responsible behaviour, and in dire need of Western assistance. An inquiry by the newly-created 
National Accountancy Bureau had revealed unapproved financial transactions; it was not pursued 
due to the sensitivity of the matter.[53] According to several sources, the ISI followed A.Q. Khan 
to Dubai in the fall of 2000. When asked for an explanation by Musharraf, who was concerned 
about financial improprieties, he complained about the surveillance, gave false excuses and 
continued his travels.[54] The same thing happened when he was asked by Musharraf to explain 
an aircraft landing in Iran.[55] A.Q. Khan was clearly reluctant to abide by the new rules, which 
included a better oversight of nuclear officials. He was making it known that he disapproved the 
reorganization of Pakistani nuclear policy.[56]  
To understand the complexity of the case, and the reasons why it remains difficult, to this day, to 
distinguish the various responsibilities, it is important to note that most known exports happened 
between 1988 (the death of Zia) and 1999 (the Musharraf takeover). In August 1988, the program 
came into the hands of President chairman GI Khan and chief of Army staff Mirza Aslam Beg. In 
the ensuing decade, the structure of Pakistani power was complex, and divided amongst three 
individuals: the President, the Prime Minister, and the chief of Army staff. For this reason, it is 
obviously difficult to answer to the question “who knew what?.”  
What seems clear is twofold. First, the Prime Ministers during that period (Bhutto and Sharif in 
particular) were not completely out of the loop. Indeed, the Pakistani government openly 
acknowledges the role of two individuals close to the Bhutto family: general Imtiaz Ali, military 
secretary to ZA Bhutto and defense adviser to his daughter Benazir, and family dentist (sic) Zafar 
Niazi.[57] Second, a handful of Pakistani leaders seem to have played a key role. One was 
general MA Beg. There is ample evidence of his involvement in Iranian-Pakistani nuclear 
cooperation. As stated above, his personal background and political preferences led him to take a 
consistent pro-Iranian, anti-American stance. Another key individual may have been president GI 
Khan. One source reported Khan as being actually in charge of the nuclear program from 1975 
until 1991.[58] As defense minister, he was involved in the decision to make Kahuta a separate 
entity under A.Q. Khan.[59] He was a member of the three-men KRL coordination board when it 
was created in 1976.[60] As finance minister, he was present at the first 1983 cold tests.[61] He 
also gave tax-free status to the BCCI, which was used as a conduit for Pakistani nuclear imports 
and exports.[62] Finally, it is hardly conceivable that successors to MA Beg as chiefs of Army 
staff (generals Nawaz, Kakar, Karamat, and Musharraf) were unaware of any transfers of nuclear 
technology. At the very least, they proved unwilling to ensure that A.Q. Khan was not able to 
proceed with unsanctioned exports. A.Q. Khan has reportedly admitted that both Kakar and 
Karamat knew and approved of his dealings with North Korea.[63] Finally, during the period 1987-
1999, A.Q. Khan, who was certainly good at manipulating the system, may have been himself 
manipulated as to ensure “plausible deniability.”  
Pakistani nuclear exports were thus partly a personal initiative, partly a State policy, in various 
proportions according to the circumstances. Different transfers probably reflected different 
situations. The apparent quid pro quo with North Korea may have been a State policy made with 
knowledge of most high-level Pakistani authorities, including Bhutto and Sharif. Of course, no 
element of Islamic solidarity was present there. Rather, it was the need to ensure the continued 
development and reliability of the liquid-fuel Pakistani missiles. The case of Libya was probably 
an A.Q. Khan initiative. However, this may also have been “payback time”: when Tripoli agreed to 
give financial support for the Pakistani program in the early 1970s, it asked for nuclear technology 
in return. ZA Bhutto never committed himself to go that far.[64] But he may have created 
expectations in Ghaddafi’s mind. The offer to Iraq was probably A.Q. Khan’s own initiative. Iran is 
the most complex case. The launching of a military-oriented nuclear cooperation was probably 
not sanctioned by President Zia ul-Haq. However, in the period 1988-1995, exports to Iran were 
known by most Pakistani leaders, including Prime Ministers Bhutto and Sharif, and deliberately 
encouraged by some, such as MA Beg and GI Khan.  
It seems that there was no constant and consistent State policy governing the nuclear exports 
made, or sanctioned, by Pakistani officials in the past 30 years. Concrete interests, personal and 
national, seem to have been the primary driver behind these exports. They were made possible 
by the large freedom of manoeuvre given to A.Q. Khan’s activities until the end of the 1990s. But 
there was, at least in one instance, in the late 1980s, an attempt to make nuclear exports part of a 
broader national strategic orientation.  
Not a Wal-Mart, but an imports-exports enterprise  
Pakistani nuclear-related exports began about a decade after their imports network was set up in 
the mid-1970s. The Pakistanis thus had acquired a very significant experience in dealing with 
nuclear transfers, legal and illegal. Contacts and procedures used for Pakistani imports were 
sometimes of direct use to exports when they involved transfers from Western firms, 
intermediaries and shell companies.  
Once fully matured, it comprised several main nodes: the UAE (the company’s headquarters), 
Malaysia, Turkey, South Africa—not including various personal properties around the world. 
There were half a dozen workshops around the globe, with Dubai serving as the main platform for 
re-exporting. A.Q. Khan set up dozens of shell companies to that effect, sometimes just for one-
time use. A total of about 50 people were actively involved in the network.[65] But A.Q. Khan 
operated with a dozen of key close associates. It was in more than one respect a family business. 
Buhary Syed Abu Tahir, a Sri Lankan national, was the chief operating officer of the exports 
network. His headquarters were the Dubai-based firm SMB Computers. His uncle, S.M. Farouq, 
was another key operative. Peter Griffin designed the Libyan Machine Shop 1001, and imported 
machines from Spain and other European countries for that project.[66] Mohammed Farooq was 
a KRL official in charge of procurement and sales abroad.[67] Paul Griffin (son of Peter Griffin), 
operated Gulf Technical Industries, one of the main Dubai-based front companies. Urs Tinner, a 
Swiss national and long-time associate of A.Q. Khan, as well as his father Friedrich and his 
brother Marco, were involved in both the Iran and Libya enterprises. Heinz Mebus, an old college 
classmate, was involve in sales to Iran. Gotthard Lerch, another long-time associate, has been 
described as the “division manager for the Libya business” and Tahir’s “main contractor.” He was 
in particular in charge of the South African node.[68] He involved Gerhard Wisser (a German 
mechanical engineer) in the Libya operation, who in turned involved Daniel Geiges (a Swiss 
mechanical engineer) and Johan Meyer (a South African engineer).[69]  
The main companies reportedly involved in centrifuges exports were: Khan Research 
Laboratories (Pakistan): ring magnets, aluminium and maraging steel, flow-forming and balancing 
equipment, vacuum pumps, non-corrosive pipes and valves, end-caps and baffles, power supply; 
Scomi Precision Engineering (Malaysia): aluminium and maraging steel, end-caps and baffles; 
SMB Computers (UAE): non-corrosive pipes and valves, end-caps and baffles, power supply; ETI 
Elektroteknik (Turkey): aluminium and maraging steel, power supply; and Trade Fin (South 
Africa): flow-forming and balancing equipment, vacuum pumps, non-corrosive pipes and 
valves.[70] Other companies involved included Bikar Mettale Asia (Singapore), Hanbando 
Balance Inc. (South Korea), Krisch Engineering (South Africa), CETEC (Switzerland), Traco 
(Switzerland), and EKA (Turkey).[71] Equipments for Libya were imported by the Tinner family 
from Spain (vacuum pumps, flow-forming machines), Italy (special furnaces), France, the United 
Kingdom and Taiwan (machine-tools), as well as Japan (a 3-D measuring tool).[72]  
The story cannot be reduced to a mere “reversal of the flow.” Most of the imports network 
remained insulated from the exports. And the North Korean deal does not seem to have 
implicated the network: it was a State-to-State enterprise, which may have included a personal 
initiative by A.Q. Khan with support from military authorities. By contrast, Libya, which was by far 
the biggest known A.Q. Khan operation, was an ad hoc project which fully involved Khan’s 
associates, and was probably hidden from the political authorities.  
But there were clear links between the imports and exports networks. Some of the components 
that A.Q. Khan exported were also components he needed for the national program; thus, starting 
in the mid-1980s, he reportedly began to order more components than necessary for the national 
program.[73] Some of the network’s customers, such as Iran, received “second-hand” 
centrifuges—those which were replaced by newer models for Pakistan’s national programs. 
Several key individuals involved in Pakistani exports were also involved in the imports. 
Mohammed Farooq, A.Q. Khan’s principal deputy, was reportedly in charge of overseas 
procurement for KRL.[74] Others were long-time associates, who he had met in the 1960s and 
1970s. They included Peter Griffin (who was involved in early imports of inverters from the UK); 
Gotthard Lerch (who used to work at Leybold Heraeus, which was to become a key contractor of 
Pakistan); Otto Heilingbrunner (same); Henk Slebos (who studied with A.Q. Khan, used to work 
at Explosive Metal Works Holland and sold various equipment to Pakistan over the years); 
Friedrich Tinner (who used to work at Vacuum Apparate Technik, a firm who sold equipment to 
Pakistan in the 1970s); and Heinz Mebus (who was involved in the first centrifuge transfers to 
Iran in the mid-1980s). Other elements of commonality exist between the two networks. Tactics 
designed to fool Western exports controls were learned for imports and used for exports. States 
such as the UAE and Turkey were major platforms for both imports and exports. And the BCCI 
was, it seems, one of the conduits used (until its demise in 1991) for payments made to Pakistani 
officials.[75]  
Thus the network was not a “Wal-Mart,” as IAEA Director General Mohammed El-Baradei 
wrongly characterized it. Rather, it was an “Imports-Exports Enterprise.” From the initial import-
oriented network under the direction of MA Khan, a separate, export-oriented branch developed 
under the direction of A.Q. Khan, starting in the mid-1980s. In the late 1990s, it became more 
decentralized as A.Q. Khan realized he was under surveillance. It became a “privatized 
subsidiary” of the imports network.  
Also, the network did not export the whole range of Pakistani technology. It sold or gave know-
how on uranium enrichment and weapons design, and centrifugation technology. Again, the “Wal-
Mart” comparison goes too far.  
IV. Learning from the Pakistani Experience  
Two additional conclusions can be drawn from this brief survey for the future study and 
understanding of proliferation networks.  
The first one is that we should not be surprised that the uncovering of A.Q. Khan’s activities did 
not kill the network. This is only logical since the exports was only one part of the Pakistani 
machinery, loosely affiliated with the rest or the network. Recent developments show that 
Pakistan has indeed continued to seek nuclear imports after 2003.[76] In August 2005, Asher 
Karni, an Israeli businessman, arrested in January 2004, was condemned in the United States to 
have exported or attempted to export, via South Africa and the UAE, 200 triggered spark gaps as 
well as high-tech oscilloscopes to Pakistan.[77] In November, Rainer Vollmerich, a German 
businessman, was condemned for having exported to Pakistan, until 2004, mechanical and 
electronic equipment with military nuclear use.[78] In May 2005, Swiss federal police stated it had 
precluded two attempts at exporting aluminium tubes of Russian origin to KRL.[79] In July, an 
European confidential report stated that Pakistan was still “shopping” for high-grade aluminium, 
ring magnets, and machine-tools that could be useful for its nuclear program. The document 
reportedly listed 20 Pakistani institutions involved in such imports.[80] Finally, in 2006, the 
Russian government revealed that Pakistan had been actively searching for nuclear-related 
technology in the country.[81] Some Pakistani officials have argued that Pakistani needs to 
continue buying abroad because of damage done to key installations by the October 2005 
earthquake.[82] While this rationale may be overstated, it seems that Pakistan will continue to 
import foreign components as spare parts and and upgrades for the modernization of its facilities 
and weapons. The construction of a second heavy-water reactor at Khushab, which is currently 
underway, may also imply additional imports.  
The second conclusion, and perhaps the most important one, is that the A.Q. Khan network is 
probably unique. Its efficiency can be explained by the fact that it was based on a State network. 
Creating a nuclear exports enterprise is easier than it was 20 or 30 years ago. For instance, as an 
observer puts it, “computers now can do the work that in the past only very sophisticated 
engineers could do. In the past, making the parts required extraordinary skill in hand-machining. 
Now poorer countries with weaker industrial bases can essentially download the software, plug it 
into a machine, and cut rare metal alloys as well as a Swiss craftsman could thirty years ago.”[83] 
But it is hardly conceivable that another Khan-like network could exist without being the offspring 
of a State machinery. In other words, the “next A.Q. Khan,” if there is one, will not be an isolated 
individual but somebody with access and experience drawn from a country’s national nuclear 
program. In sum, the “next A.Q. Khan” could only be, for instance, Iranian or North Korean.  
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